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THE PHENOMENON OF IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER
FEDERAL STATUTES: JUDICIAL INSIGHT,
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OR LEGISLATION
BY THE JUDICIARY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the unprecedented scope and volume of federal legislation, an
increasingly prominent place in the complex system of legal rights and
liabilities has been accorded to federal statutes. In many cases, Congress
designs a comprehensive system of public or public and private remedies to
insure compliance with the statutory program. In other cases, however, laws
which may have been passed to protect essentially private rights are drafted
without any provision for enforcement by or recovery to those members of the
public most affected by violations. Whether such omissions are deliberate
exclusions or unintentional omissions, in recent years courts have construed
such statutes so as to find implied in their terms private rights of civil action.
This Note will examine the various bases on which courts have rested
decisions to impose on violators such civil liability in the absence of express
legislative authorization. In addition, it will focus on a recent decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which found an implied private action
for damages under the penal provisions of the federal election contributions
laws.
II. JUDICIAL TESTS FOR FINDING IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS
The courts have developed at least four tests to determine whether to find
an implied private cause of action as an adjunct to the statutorily designated
remedy. The tests, in order of importance, are (1) whether the legislative
history of the statute and the remedial provisions in the statute taken alone
and in relation to other sections and other acts demonstrate a clear expression
of legislative intent respecting private action; (2) whether a private action
would further the purposes of the statute; (3) whether the statutory remedies
have been adequately enforced; and (4) whether the plaintiff is adequately
protected by a state cause of action. Examination of the legislative history of
the particular statute under analysis is the common factor in applying the first
two tests.I
Under the "clear legislative intent" test, the court seeks to find any
expressions of congressional attitude favoring or disfavoring private causes of
action. 2 Different courts have followed contradictory approaches to the test.
1. National Ass'n for Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D.D.C. 1973).
2. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1964) (the remedy provided by the statute held
to have been intended as exclusive means of enforcing labor elections law); Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 380-82 (1958) (same for antitrust statute); Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 306 (1943) (same for Railway Labor Act); Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40 (1916) (statutory language showed that private actions were
intended); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (private
causes of action not intended by Congress under Federal Trade Commission Act).
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In Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 3 the Tenth Circuit stated the test as
follows:
This court will not fashion civil remedies from federal regulatory statutes except
where ... the intent of Congress to create private rights can be found in the statute or
in its legislative history. Had the Congress intended to create private causes of action
and private remedies, it was fully capable of directly and clearly so providing. 4
In contrast, in Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion5 the Ninth Circuit
posed the test in the following terms:
In the absence of a clear congressional intent to the contrary, the courts are free to
fashion appropriate civil remedies based on the violation of a penal statute where
necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of the congressional purpose. 6
This latter orientation clearly assumes a judicial power to create remedies
unless restricted by affirmative act of Congress. The Chavez approach, on the
other hand, requires an affirmative congressional act before courts may grant
remedies unexpressed in the statute. This dichotomy clearly underlines the
differing views regarding the constitutional question of separation of powers
implicated by "judicial legislation."'7
Examples of the use of legislative materials to determine congressional
attitude toward an implied private enforcement action are found in National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers
(Amtrak)8 and Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 9 In Amtrak the Supreme
Court denied an implied private cause of action under the Rail Passenger
Service Act in part because it found that Congress had considered and
rejected a draft bill which would have permitted a private remedy.' 0 In
Jordan, the Eighth Circuit disallowed a private damages action partly on the
basis of language in a congressional committee report to the effect that failure
to provide for private civil actions under the credit advertising section of the
Federal Truth in Lending Act was a deliberate omission. 1 Courts have a
wide variety of other sources available for discerning congressional intent,
3. 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
4. Id. at 894-95; cf. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974) ("inference of such a private cause of action ... must be consistent with the
evident legislative intent ....") [hereinafter cited as Amtrak]; Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.,
485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Comment, Civil Responsibility for Corporate Political
Expenditures, 20 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1327, 1342-43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Civil Respon-
sibility].
5. 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970).
6. Id. at 1033; see Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967);
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
7. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
8. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
9. 442 F.2d 78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
10. 414 U.S. at 456-61, construing Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 § 307(a), 45 U.S.C.
§ 547(a) (1970).
11. 442 F.2d at 81, construing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-65 (1970).
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including committee hearings, debates and votes on proposed amendments to
the bill at issue. 12
Seldom does the relevant legislative history contain such clear expressions
of congressional intent that the court may dispose of claims simply by quoting
the appropriate document; more frequently, evidence is ambiguous or
scarce. 13 In these situations, some courts have deemed manifestations which
seem to favor private civil action persuasive in finding implied remedies.1
4
Relatively forthright evidence of congressional disapproval, however, has
been held insufficient, without further justifications, to cause other courts to
refuse to find implied causes of action claimed to exist.I s When the legislative
history is devoid of any treatment of the subject, courts have diverged along
the lines of the Chavez-Burke split. One line of cases finds silence equivalent
to a legislative prohibition which courts ought not disturb.' 6 The other line
construes silence to be tantamount to permission to allow private action on
the theory that Congress did not expressly preclude such suits.1
7
It can be argued that the "clear legislative intent" test orientation chosen by
a court in such cases is a function of its already-reached decision to award or
not to award a private cause of action. Thus, a court may employ a
Burke-like analysis if it is in favor of finding an implied cause of action in a
given case, but a Chavez-like exposition if it is about to deny such a claim.
Further, it has even been disputed
[w]hether there is such a thing as a discoverable legislative intent . . . . The
controversy has centered principally over the relevance and competence of legislative
history materials in ascertaining legislative intent as well as the weight which should
12. G. Folsom, Legislative History 8-12 (1972); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory
Construction ch. 48 (C. Sands 4th rev. ed. 1973).
13. Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1974).
14. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311
U.S. 282 (1940). In Borak the Court placed great emphasis on the wording of the section of the
Act which granted exclusive federal jurisdiction over Exchange Act violations. Quoting from
Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., supra, at 288, in which a substantially identical
jurisdictional section of the Securities Act of 1933 was involved, the court stated: - 'The power to
enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the
power to make the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or
actions normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case.' "377
U.S. at 433-34 (italics deleted). The analyses in both Deckert and Borak fail to resolve the
question whether Congress intended to grant the power to bring enforcement actions to private
litigants rather than solely to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
15. E.g., Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964); Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943). But see Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation
Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
16. Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 894-95 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S.
1042 (1972).
17. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967); Burke v. Compania
Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1970); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d
691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
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be accorded them. The Supreme Court not infrequently divides as to what is shown by
or may be implied from legislative history. 18
It may be, therefore, that application of the "clear legislative intent" test is, in
many cases, either futile or sham.
An indirect application of the "intent" inquiry is found in judicial use of the
rule of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius. By this
rule, courts seek to discover Congress' view toward private remedies for
statutory violations not set forth explicitly in the law by assessing the
probable preclusive intent implicit in legislative enactment of other specific
remedies.1 9 A clear expression of the doctrine is found in Botany Worsted
Mills v. United States,20 where the Supreme Court stated: "When a statute
limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any
other mode. '21
In Amtrak and in T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States,2 2 the Supreme Court
applied this concept in different statutory contexts. In Amtrak, the Court
looked only to the particular section of the railway passenger act23 in which
plaintiff claimed an implied private power of enforcement. 24 That section
allowed the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief against improper use of
Amtrak's schedule-reduction powers in ordinary cases, and permitted private
parties to seek injunctions in cases of labor agreement disputes. 25 The Court
concluded that the section's grant of private enforcement power in labor cases
evidenced congressional intent to foreclose private action in other situations. 26
In T.I.M.E., however, the Court looked outside the section, and even outside
the Act in question, to apply the expressio unius rule in denying a private
action to recover unreasonable trucking freight charges violative of the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 (Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act).27 Because both
18. G. Folsom, Legislative History 7-8 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
19. Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 470-71
(1959); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); cf. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373,
380-82 (1958).
20. 278 U.S. 282 (1929).
21. Id. at 289 (quoted in Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 458).
22. 359 U.S. 464 (1959). For a discussion of this case see The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 84, 213-17 (1959).
23. Section 307(a), 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
24. 414 U.S. at 458-65.
25. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 § 307(a), 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
26. 414 U.S. at 458. Application of the expressio unius rule, however, was deemed unpersua-
sive in cases concerning implied federal causes of action where the purpose of the act would have
been frustrated to some degree by its application. Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285, 290-91 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Implying Civil
Remedies]; see Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 198-200 (1967) (act
rendering unlawful the negligent creation of obstructions in navigable waters); United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 487 (1960) (same); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways,
229 F.2d 499, 500-02 (2d Cir. 1956) (act rendering unlawful the refusal of airline passage on the
basis of race).
27. 359 U.S. at 472-80, construing Interstate Commerce Act, Part II, § 202(b), 49 Stat. 543
(1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1970) (Motor Carrier Act). The Interstate Commerce Act,
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the Transportation Act of 192028 and the Interstate Commerce Act of 194029
(Parts I and II of the Interstate Commerce Act) specifically allowed private
recovery of unreasonable freight charges, the Court concluded that the
legislature's failure to provide for a similar action under the Motor Carrier
Act was intentional.30
Experience and reason show that successful application of the expressio
unius rule always will result in denial of the implied remedy sought.3' This is
because the premise of the rule is that intentional action to provide express
remedies imports intentional action to exclude other remedies. Whether that
premise is supportable in any but the most obvious of circumstances, how-
ever, is open to serious doubt.3 2
When the "dear legislative intent" test is not dispositive, the "purpose of
the act" test must be satisfied. 33 In some circumstances, this test could
supersede what would seem to be clear intent to allow private action: for
example, if private enforcement or private actions for damages would subvert
the remedial scheme in the statute. 34 The primary inquiry under the "pur-
pose" test is whether the allowance of an implied private cause of action
would promote any of the principal objectives for which Congress enacted the
statute as part of a comprehensive legislative program. 3 s An evaluation of the
practical consequences of allowing private enforcement is inherent in this
inquiry. 36 For example, the possibility of multiple and duplicative suits
against the same defendant 37 and possible interference with the functioning of
governmental regulatory agencies 38 are relevant considerations.
which created the Interstate Commerce Commission, is a regulatory rather than a penal statute.
While some different considerations may apply in finding private causes of action under
regulatory laws, many factors are the same. Compare Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d
986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), with Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803
(D.D.C. 1971).
28. Interstate Commerce Act, Part I, § 400(1)(a), 41 Stat. 474 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(1)(a) (1970) (relating to rail transportation).
29. Id., Part III, §§ 303-04, 54 Stat. 931-34 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 903-04 (1970)
(water transportation).
30. 359 U.S. at 470-72. See also Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck Lines, Inc.,
216 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); H. Black, Handbook on the
Construction and Interpretation of the Laws § 72 (1911); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory
Construction §§ 47.23-.24 (C. Sands 4th rev. ed. 1973).
31. See, e.g., note 22 supra.
32. See, e.g., discussion in Part III infra.
33. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp, 485 F.2d
986, 989, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas
Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 680 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973).
34. See note 26 supra.
35. Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453, 461-64 (1974); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F Supp. 1014,
1017 (D. ,ass. 1949).
36. See Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 461-64; Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
37. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
38. Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 461-64; Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.. 485 F.2d 986, 999 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Implying Civil Remedies, supra note 26, at 296.
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In Amtrak, the Court noted that a primary object of Congress' railroad
reorganization program39 was to permit the expeditious elimination of un-
economic train routes by the quasi-public corporation created by the Act,
under the general supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 40 The
Court held, therefore, that to allow individual passengers to challenge route
reduction plans by private actions would impede attainment of the congres-
sional purpose. 4 1 On the other hand, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,42 the Court
perceived the purpose of the securities laws-to protect investors-to be of
crucial importance to its finding of an implied cause of action for damages
and granted an injunction against violation of the proxy solicitation statute.4 3
In the context of the "purpose of the act" test, courts determine whether
Congress intended that the statute protect a specifically definable class of
persons, which includes the present plaintiff, from the type of harm about
which he complains. 44 For a federal statute to create a class of plaintiffs who
39. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
40. 414 U.S. at 461.
41. Id. at 461-64.
42. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), noted in 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1336 (1964); 50 Cornell L.Q. 370 (1965);
59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 809 (1965); 1964 U. Ill. L.F. 838; 18 Vand. L. Rev. 275 (1964). The courts
have had extensive experience in implying private causes of action under the federal securities
laws. E.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'g on rehearing en banc 453
F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1971) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970));
Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 94,618 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1974) (Investment Adviser's Act of 1940 § 206, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970)), noted in 43 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (1974); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F.
Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970)); 1 A.
Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-5 § 2.4(1) (1973).
43. 377 U.S. at 430-33, construing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1970). "Broadly stated, the rule is that where defendant's violation of a prohibitory
statute has caused injury to plaintiff the latter has a right of action if one of the purposes of the
enactment was to protect individual interests like the plaintiff's." Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949) (relying on Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934)); see note
44 infra and accompanying text.
44. Wyandotte Tr..nsp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-02 (1967); Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1970).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965) provides: "The court may adopt as the standard of
conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons
which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular Interest which
is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to
protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results." However, a
statutory standard will not be found in a statute "whose purpose is found to be exclusively (a) to
protect the interests of the state or any subdivision of it as such, or (b) to secure to individuals the
enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they are entitled only as members ;f the public .... "
Id. § 288. See also W. Prosser, Torts § 36, at 194-95 (4th ed. 1971). In an unusual case, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court found a private cause of
action for damages in favor of an individual who alleged injury from a violation of his rights
under the fourth amendment of the Constitution, which protects the "class" of nearly all persons
in the United States.
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may be potential beneficiaries under the statute, it must directly or by clear
inference grant to the prospective plaintiffs a federal right to be free from
conduct which violates the statute.4 s In addition, such conduct directly must
cause a cognizable harm to the prospective plaintiff.4 6
In contrast, when the statute is found to have been designed for the general
welfare of the entire community-such as broad regulatory or penal
statutes--some courts have refused to imply private remedies against
violators.47 Enforcement of this type of statute by private action is inappro-
priate for several reasons. Characteristically, violations result in intangible
harm to a large segment, if not all, of society, or in such slight harm as to fall
within the de minimis doctrine, or in some tangible harm which is identical in
the case of all persons affected by the violation. These factors are conducive
to judicial decisions that private parties lack standing to bring a suit based on
the violation, that to allow private actions will result in multiplicious lawsuits
wasteful of judicial resources, or that the public or common remedy expressly
afforded by the statute provides the most efficient method to insure com-
pliance with the statutory terms and objectives and to remedy injuries caused
by violations.
A recent case under the federal election laws limiting individual contribu-
tions and committee expenditures, 48 Common Cause v. Democratic National
Committee,49 illustrates the close interrelationship between findings under the
"purpose of the act" and the subsidiary "class of plaintiffs" inquiry. Here the
court found that
[a]n analysis of the legislative history of §§ 608 and 609 warrants the conclusion that
voters, campaign contributors and workers, and candidates whose legitimate resources
were.., overwhelmed by large contributions to such an extent as to undermine and
perhaps even nullify their right to vote were the intended beneficiaries of the statutes
and comprise a class whose interests may be protected by a private civil action. 50
45. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 679 (D.
Neb. 1972), affd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973).
46. Id.; see Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 469 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159, 164 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152 (1970). The issue of standing to bring an implied private action is inextricably intertwined
with the initial finding of the implied action. Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Consequently, it will not be discussed in this Note as a separate issue.
47. United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 553 (1878) (smuggling statute); see Oppenheim v.
Sterling, 368 F.2d 516, 518-19 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011 (1967) (mail fraud
statute); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 811 (D.D.C. 1971)
(dictum); cf. W. Prosser, Torts § 36, at 192-93 (4th ed. 1971).
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 608, 609 (1970). Sections 608 and 609 have since been amended and
repealed, respectively. Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, §§ 203,
204, 86 Stat. 9, 10, repealing and amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 608 & 609 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 608 (Supp. II, 1972)). See also note 120 infra.
49. 333 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971).
50. Id. at 812. The political contribution sections of the election laws may be viewed,
however, as broadly regulatory and penal, and thus intended to benefit the general public rather
than to grant to private individuals the right to be free from the prohibited conduct. See Ash v
Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 428-29 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W.
1974]
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Thus, since the purpose of these sections was to safeguard the rights of certain
persons, the court concluded that it would be appropriate to accord an
implied power of injunctive relief to those who comprised the protected class.
Moreover, in Borak, the Supreme Court used a "class of plaintiffs" analysis in
authorizing the institution of a shareholder derivative action as the proper
device by which to pursue the implied damages action which it found in the
securities laws. Reasoning that the shareholders of the target company in a
merger were vindicating the rights of their company rather than recovering
for personal losses due to violation of the federal proxy solicitation statute, the
Court concluded that "[t]o hold that derivative actions are not within the
sweep of the section would ... be tantamount to a denial of private relief."' 51
In some cases where courts have discussed the third test-adequacy of the
statutorily designated method of enforcement-the inability or unwillingness
of the person charged with executing the law to bring enforcement actions has
been found persuasive in permitting injured parties to bring private suits. 52 In
Common Cause, for example, the court concluded from the apparent absence
of criminal enforcement of sections 608 and 609 of the election laws that the
Justice Department had been unable to enforce either section and that private
enforcement power would help to insure compliance with the statutory
program.5 3 Similarly, in Borak, the Court accepted the contention of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae, that an implied
damages action under the proxy section of the securities laws was a necessary
supplement to the SEC's supervisory and enforcement role due to the limited
staff and resources of the Commission.5 4
While the policy consideration which leads to inquiry into the record of
enforcement of the statute is apparent, the test is of dubious propriety. 55 The
degree to which a federal statute is enforced is a product both of congressional
judgment of the importance of pursuing violators (as reflected by the funds
appropriated to the relevant agency for that purpose) and of prosecutorial
discretion. It would seem, therefore, that by considering lack of enforcement
of the statute as a factor favoring implied private causes of action, courts
encroach on the provinces of the legislative and executive branches. Thus far,
at least, inadequate enforcement has not been held sufficient, by itself, to
overcome a contrary conclusion drawn on the basis of the first two tests. 56
3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (No. 73-1908). In this connection, it is important to note that plaintiffs
in Common Cause did not seek individual damages, as did plaintiff in Ash, but rather sought
injunctive enforcement to prevent injury to the elective process.
51. 377 U.S. at 432.
52. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967) (dictum).
53. 333 F. Supp. at 813. Apparently, no prosecution had ever been brought under § 608 or
§ 609. Brief of Appellees at 21, Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (No. 73-1908) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellees].
Another possible remedy would have been for plaintiffs to petition Congress to appropriate
additional funds for the enforcement of the law.
54. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
55. See note 100 infra.
56. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chavez v.
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In implied private damages cases, courts have considered, as a fourth test,
the effectiveness of existing state remedies as an alternative to finding an
implied federal remedy.5 7 When courts conclude that a federal statute has
created a federal right to be administered in federal court, a federal remedy
will be found notwithstanding the presence of state remedies which would
serve essentially the same purpose.5 8 On the other hand, when no compelling
federal interest is involved, courts have treated the availability of a private
state remedy as a factor militating against claimed implied federal suits.5 9
To the extent that judicial creation of federal remedies in cases where
adequate state remedies exist constitutes a determination that Congress
impliedly considered the coexisting state remedy to be insufficient, this test
should be employed sparingly. One court has counselled wisely that
[j]udicial implication of ancillary Federal remedies is a matter to be treated with care,
lest a carefully erected legislative scheme-often the result of a delicate balance of
Federal and state, public and private interests-be skewed by the courts, albeit
inadvertently. 60
In Borak, the Supreme Court found an implied shareholder derivative action
under the federal securities laws despite the existence of alternative state
remedies. 6' This decision has been criticized as tantamount to a supplantation
of state law without a clear legislative expression of intent to achieve that end:
The significance of [Borak] lies in the Court's assertion that overriding federal law
Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. I042 (1972); Civil
Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1343-44.
57. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971); see Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973). As a question of policy, consideration
of alternative means of redress other than state actions may be appropriate in some cases. Id.;
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 679 (D. Neb.
1972), affd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973).
58. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432, 434-35 (1964); 50 Cornell L.Q. 370, 371-72
(1965). "[Tlhe overriding federal law applicable here would, where the facts required, control the
appropriateness of redress despite the provisions of state corporation law, for it 'is not uncommon
for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned.' . .
"... Furthermore, the hurdles that the victim might face [in state actions] (such as separate
suits .... security for expenses statutes, bringing in all parties necessary for complete relief, etc.)
might well prove insuperable to effective relief." 377 U.S. at 434-35 (citations omitted).
59. Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1042 (1972); Implying Civil Remedies, supra note 26, at 292-93; see McCord v. Dixie Aviation
Corp., 450 F.2d 1129, 1130 (10th Cir. 1971); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck
Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543, 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
60. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61. See 377 U.S. at 434-35. By creating a federal remedy not expressly provided by Congress
and by removing an impediment to shareholder derivative suits, Borak represents an incursion by
the federal courts into an area which had been regulated primarily, if not exclusively, by the
states. Implication of a federal cause of action freed the plaintiff-investors in Borak from certain
of the anti-strike suit prerequisites to state derivative suits. However, derivative suits brought in
federal court remain subject to the "contemporaneous ownership" requirement-that plaintiff
owned stock in the corporation both at the time of the alleged injury and at the time of the action.
Fed. R_ Civ. P. 23.1.
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controls the appropriateness of redress despite the provisions of state corporation law;
the interpretation of this statement may determine the development of federal rules of
liability for corporate misconduct in an area of the law heretofore reserved to the
states. In view of the absence of congressional purpose to displace established
corporation law, it is important that the broadly worded decision of the Court be
restricted to its proper sphere-the effective enforcement of [the proxy section]. 62
This reasoning is applicable whenever courts ignore available alternative
recourses of a plaintiff-whether to state judicial or federal administrative
remedies-in implying a federal private cause of action.
63
The four tests discussed above must be viewed with the caveat that they
are clearly interrelated and contain overlapping considerations. It is difficult
in concrete cases, for example, to distinguish a court's legislative intent
analysis from its "purpose of the act" criterion. Soo too, the "purpose of the act"
and "class of plaintiffs" inquiries share many similar aspects. 64 For analytical
purposes, however, it is possible to identify areas of judicial concern in cases
presenting the question of implied private remedies. Among these four tests,
"record of enforcement" and "state remedies" are decidedly less important
than "clear legislative intent" and "purpose of the act." In some cases, the
former two tests seem to have been used only to further justify a result
otherwise supportable and already reached. 65 The fact that they are applied,
however, indicates that they represent additional areas of judicial interest. 66
III. A RECENT EXAMPLE: Ash v. Cort
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Ash v. Cort,61 a case
arising under section 610 of the federal election laws. 68 That section imposes
criminal penalties upon corporations for making partisan political contribu-
tions to candidates or political parties for the purpose of influencing federal
elections.
In Ash, a stockholder of Bethlehem Steel Corporation who was registered
62. 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1336, 1338 (1964).
63. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 999-1001 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
64. See note 46 supra.
65. See, e.g., Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453, 464 (1974).
66. See notes 52-63 supra and accompanying text.
67. 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (No.
73-1908).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). "It is unlawful ...
for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure In
connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or
Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates
for any of the foregoing offices . ...
"Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution or expenditure in
violation of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or director of any
corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who consents to any contribution or expenditure
by the corporation or labor organization, as the case may be ... shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if the violation was willful, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id.
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to vote in federal elections brought a shareholder derivative suit in federal
court seeking damages from and an injunction against Bethlehem directors. 69
He alleged that the directors illegally had expended general corporate funds to
publish a partisan political advertisement consisting of partial reprints of a
speech by the chairman of the Bethlehem board of directors. The district
court refused plaintiffs application for a preliminary injunction and granted
defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for a permanent injunction on the
ground that section 610 does not authorize private remedies. In addition, the
court ordered plaintiff to post security for defendants' expenses in relation to
his pendant state claim that the political expenditure was actionable corporate
waste. Plaintiff amended his complaint to eliminate the pendant claim and
substituted a count for damages under section 610, urging the court to
recognize an implied private cause of action to return the illegally spent
moneys to the corporate treasury. The district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff had no right of
action under section 610 and that, in any event, defendants' acts did not
violate the section.70 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding an implied
private damages action under the section and holding that plaintiff had
standing to bring such an action. 71
No direct precedent existed for the Third Circuit's decision in Ash v. Cort
to find an implied cause of action for damages in section 610 of the federal
election laws. Comnwn Cause,72 which involved sections 608 and 609, is
distinguishable on the ground that plaintiffs there sought only private injunc-
tive enforcement rather than money damages.73
Several federal district courts and state tribunals have allowed derivative
actions by shareholders or direct suits by corporations to recover corporate
funds contributed to political causes in violation of state statutes analogous to
the federal law. In none of the opinions is it clear, however, how the court
arrived at its decision, or whether it was creating an implied statutory cause
of action rather than extending an existing form of action.7 4
69. At all times relevant to the case, plaintiff owned fifty shares of Bethlehem Steel
Corporation common stock. Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afid per
curiam, 471 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1973) (proceedings on application for preliminary injunction).
70. Ash v. Cort, Civil No. 72-1925 (E.D. Pa., July 11, 1973), rev'd, 496 F 2(1 416 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (No. 73-1908).
71. 496 F.2d 416, 421-24 (3d Cir. 1974) (per Seitz, J.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U-S.
Nov. 11, 1974) (No. 73-1908). The court also found the alleged political bias of Bethlehem's
statements to be a disputed factual issue and held, therefore, that summary judgment was
inappropriate. Id. at 425-26.
72. 333 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971).
73. Id. at 806.
74. In Schwartz v. Romnes, 357 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 495
F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974), district court opinion noted in 5 St. Mary's L.J. 848 (1974), the district
court ruled that a shareholder could maintain a derivative action to sue a corporation for a
contribution in violation of New York's equivalent of § 610. 357 F. Supp. at 37-38. It is not clear
from the opinion whether the court was implying a private cause of action under the statute or
allowing a cause of action under the doctrine prohibiting ultra vires corporate acts (see notes
107-09 infra and accompanying text), or both. See 357 F. Supp. at 37-38. But se S St. Mary's
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In Ash v. Cort, the Third Circuit mentioned, but did not apply, the "clear
legislative intent" test.7 5 Since the legislative history of section 610 is devoid
of reference to private civil remedies, 7 6 its application would have yielded no
affirmative result. 77 Unlike those courts which have construed congressional
silence alternately as a de facto legislative pronouncement in favor of or
against implied private civil action, 78 however, the Ash court accorded the
silence no weight at all.
7 9
In all implied cause of action cases, the ultimate issue for the court is
whether a private remedy for statutory violations is compatible with the
express provisions written into the statute by Congress. 80 The primary
question, which is embodied in the "clear legislative intent" test, is whether
Congress desired private actions-directly for enforcement or indirectly for
damages-to serve as an adjunct to the express remedies set forth. Measured
against this standard, the Ash court could reach no conclusion, since it
appears to have recognized correctly that there was no evidence Congress had
ever considered this issue in connection with section 610.81
Ash turned, therefore, to the "purpose of the act" test and the related "class
of plaintiffs" inquiry. 82 The majority found in the predecessor to section 610,
the Corrupt Practices Act, a legislative desire to destroy corporate financial
influence over elections and to prevent corporate officials from using corpo-
rate funds for political purposes without shareholder approval. 83 Plaintiff was
L.J. 848 (1974). In Capital Elec. Power Ass'n v. Phillips, 240 So. 2d 133 (Miss. 1970), the court
upheld without discussion a cross-complaint by a corporation against its former general manager
for return of corporate funds illegally donated as a political contribution. See generally Civil
Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1340. One district court case denied a cause of action in the
analogous situation of union members seeking reimbursement of the union treasury for funds
spent by union officials in violation of § 610. Relying on the district court opinion in Ash, the
court ruled that § 610 did not authorize private action and suggested that the plaintiffs seek
institution of a criminal prosecution. McNamara v. Johnston, 360 F. Supp. 517, 525-27 & n.20
(N.D. Ill. 1973). But see note 100 infra.
75. 496 F.2d at 421 & n.3. The court stated: "Certainly, legislative intent is relevant; where
the legislature clearly has indicated its intent to grant or withhold a cause of action, implicitly or
explicitly, courts will give effect to that intent. . . . Absent some reasonably clear indication of
legislative attention.., however, courts ascertain the policies underlying the substantive law and
determine the propriety, as a means of effectuating those policies, of affording litigants a
particular remedy." Id. at 421 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 428 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Providing criminal penalties and publicizing contribu-
tions through reporting were considered by Congress as the proper methods for dealing with
corporate campaign contributions. See 65 Cong. Rec. 9507 (1924) (remarks of Senator Borah).
77. 496 F.2d at 421.
78. See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
79. 496 F.2d at 421-22.
80. This assumes that the court in Ash was creating an implied statutory cause of action and
not a common law action for corporate waste based on the inherent power of the judiciary to
create remedies. Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938).
81. 496 F.2d at 421 (by implication); id. at 427 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); Brief of Appellees at
7.
82. 496 F.2d at 422; see note 33 supra.
83. 496 F.2d at 422; see United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570-75 (1957); 117 Cong.
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found to be a member of the class to be protected since, as a voter, he clearly
fell within section 610's purpose of protecting voters from dilution of their
franchise. 84 Furthermore, the plaintiff as stockholder also fell within the
statutory protection intended by section 610, since 610 had as a second
purpose the protection of shareholders from illegal expenditures of corporate
funds. Thus, the court reasoned that return of those funds to the corporate
treasury by means of a derivative action, a mechanism already approved by
the Supreme Court in Borak,85 was appropriate to advance the purpose of the
Act.86 Although the court recognized that "the breadth of § 610's coverage
favors enforcement solely by criminal sanction to avoid a multiplicity of
possible suits challenging intangible public harm,187 it also noted that "[t]his
objection pertains to suits by non-stockholder citizens.1 88 Emphasizing that
plaintiff Ash was both a voter and a stockholder,8 9 the court cured its
objection by narrowly limiting the class of plaintiffs who could bring private
actions to those occupying the dual voter-shareholder status.90
To support its conclusion that private enforcement would further the
purpose of section 610, the court also noted that violations of that section
most likely would occur immediately before elections. 9 1 It suggested, there-
fore, that enforcement by civil actions would be more responsive 92 and
effective in implementing the Act than post facto enforcement by criminal
proceedings. 93 The court made clear that its decision rested principally on the
"purpose of the act" test and the related "class of plaintiffs" inquiry.94
Rec. 43,381 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Hansen); 41 Cong. Rec. 22 (1906) (annual message of
President Theo. Roosevelt); 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1905) (annual message of President Theo.
Roosevelt); Comment, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70 Yale L.J. 821, 836 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Corporate Political Affairs].
84. 496 F.2d at 422; cf. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-56 (1969); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962); Nader v. Kleindienst, 375 F. Supp. 1138, 1140 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Common Cause
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 812-13 (D.D.C. 1971).
85. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
86. 496 F.2d at 423-24. "As a stockholder, plaintiff is within the class secondarily protected
by § 610, which keeps control over political contributions in his hands and not in those of
corporate managers or directors." Id. at 422.
87. Id. at 423.
88. Id. at 423 n.6.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court's treatment of this issue implies that if plaintiff had been a voter only, an
implied cause of action would not have been found because of the evident danger that unlimited
suits would hinder attainment of a congressional purpose. See id. at 422-23. See also Amtrak, 414
U.S. 453, 463 (1974); notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text. This again implicates the nexus
between standing to bring an implied cause of action and the creation of that action. See note 46
supra.
91. 496 F.2d at 423-24.
92. While a civil action for an injunction could be relatively swift, see id. at 424, a private
damages action would probably last an extended period of time.
93. Id. at 423-24.
94. Id. at 421. The court's "class of plaintiffs" analysis is accurate, provided that its findings
19741
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The first purpose of the Corrupt Practices Act, to which the Ash court
looked in reaching its decision, was to eliminate the influence over elections
which corporations had exercised through financial contributions. 95 Inasmuch
as the 1972 election-during which the defendants allegedly violated the
Act 96-was completed and any influence over elected candidates that might
result from campaign contributions was an accomplished fact, any recovery
by the corporation could not advance the preventive goal of this purpose of
the Act. With respect to future elections, however, the prospect of forced
repayment to the corporate treasury by the director-defendants could serve a
deterrent effect, especially since that remedy would be implemented, in
theory, by thousands of corporate voter-shareholders. Yet, in setting out
criminal sanctions in the form of fines and imprisonment, Congress had built
a deterrent into section 610. Thus, in the context of the first goal of the Act,
the Ash decision creates a liability which is, in some ways, duplicative of that
provided for by Congress. Query whether it is the province of the judiciary,
under the guise of statutory construction, to determine that the remedial and
prophylactic measures enacted by the legislature are insufficient. 97
While the court also found within the Corrupt Practices Act a purpose of
preventing corporate officials from donating corporate funds to political
parties without shareholder approval, evidence to support this view is
scant.98 It can be said that simply by outlawing all corporate political
contributions Congress acted to fulfill this goal, since under section 610 no
corporate moneys legally may be used, with or without shareholder approval,
for political purposes. Nevertheless, if the allegations of the plaintiff are
true, 99 unscrupulous directors may still be draining corporate treasuries
illegally. Thus, the question is whether the second purpose of the Act is
sufficient to support the proposition that section 610 should be construed to
provide a federal right remediable by a federal private cause of action for
damages because shareholder-voters are peculiarly injured by violation of its
provisions.
The court also discussed the prior history of enforcement of section 610, 100
as to the "purpose of the act" test are a valid base from which to construct an implied cause of
action which would be available to some group of potential plaintiffs.
95. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
96. 496 F.2d at 418.
97. See note 110 infra.
98. In support of its finding of the second purpose of § 610, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), cited only one page of legislative hearings and one page of
congressional debate. Id. at 113, citing Hearings before the House Comm. on the Election of the
President, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1906); 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1905). No other support for the
point has been found in the legislative history of the Act.
99. 496 F.2d at 418.
100. Id. at 423; see notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text. While the Justice Department
has enforced § 610, it has been suggested that many violators are not prosecuted. Farr, Political
Contributions by Corporations in Federal Elections, 19 Bus. Law. 789, 790 (1964); Lambert,
Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, in 1966-1967 Corporate Practice Commen-
tator 343, 351; Civil Responsibility 1328 & n.7; see Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1974, at 14, col. 1. A writ
of mandamus to compel government enforcement of § 610 will not necessarily result in
-nforcement. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the third test for implying a private right of action, and suggested that
government enforcement may be insufficient and that public officials elected
with the help of corporate donations may not promote prosecutions of
donating companies for violations of the section. 0o The court implied that it
would be appropriate to allow individual plaintiffs to act as private attorneys
general in enforcing section 610.102 However, whether the act has been
enforced effectively is not an issue meet for judicial consideration.10 3
Moreover, unlike the apparent situation in Common Cause, 104 the Justice
Department has attempted to enforce the prohibitions of section 610. 15 Ash
offered no factual evidence that would justify its theory that elected officials
who have received corporate donations will suppress, or have the power to
suppress, prosecutions by the Justice Department. Finally, unlike Borak,
there was no urging by the Justice Department by way of an amicus curiae
brief, that a private right of action was necessary or that the Justice
Department was unable to handle adequately the situations in which the Act
was violated.10 6
The Ash court did not consider the alternative remedies available to the
plaintiff under state law. It in substance used a federal election law to effect a
remedy for what is essentially misuse of corporate funds by directors. Argu-
ably, since section 610 provides only criminal sanctions, Congress impliedly
left protection of the corporate fisc to traditional state actions for corporate
mismanagement and/or commission of ultra vires acts. 1 7 While Borak sanc-
101. 496 F.2d at 423-24.
102. Id. at 423. The Ash court did not deal with defendants' contentions that to allow a
private cause of action would lead to frivolous suits and an increase in the judicial workload.
Brief of Appellees at 20. Defendants' final argument against the implied private cause of action
was that § 610 is of doubtful constitutionality under the first amendment and that, therefore, its
coverage should not be expanded by judicial construction. Id. at 20-21. The court believed its
construction of the statute obviated the necessity of reaching the constitutional contentions and
noted that the issue could be reasserted on remand. 496 F.2d at 426. The first amendment issue
is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
103. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. The Ash court denominated the enforcement
test as a "collateral" consideration. 496 F.2d at 423.
104. See note 53 supra.
105. See materials discussed in note 100 supra.
106. 377 U.S. at 427, 432.
107. In this area of the law, it is useful to employ a broad, functional definition of "ultra
vires" to denote ';corporate activity which, if challenged in a derivative lawsuit, will result in
liability for those instigating the activity." Civil Responsibility 1327 n.1, 1328-40. Commentators
disagree on whether an ultra vires cause of action can be maintained for illegal political
contributions. Compare Garrett, Corporate Contributions for Political Purposes, 14 Bus. Law.
365, 367 (1959), with Corporate Political Affairs, supra note 83, at 850-51. It appears from the
weight of authority that such an action is possible. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the
Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. Rev. 157, 189 n. 197 (1970); Civil Responsibility 1329; Corporate Political
Affairs 850-56. But see Garrett, supra, at 367. Some older cases dealt with the issue of whether or
not corporate political contributions are ultra vires expenditures of corporate funds. Mobile Gas
Co. v. Patterson, 293 F. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1923) (political contributions not proper business
expense); McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling Co., 31 Mont. 563, 79 P 248 (1905)
(directors chargeable for contribution to political movement unless authorized by shareholders);
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tioned a federal remedy which regulated some aspects of internal corporate
affairs,' 0 8 perhaps the rationale of a case arising under the securities laws
should not be readily applied to a federal election law which arguably was not
intended to intrude so forcefully into the same area. 0 9
In his dissent, Judge Aldisert asserted that a cause of action should not be
implied without first finding at least some relevant indication of congressional
intent favoring private enforcement."10 He noted that Congress recently had
reviewed the election laws but had not inserted any provision for private
action in section 610. 1 In his view, this failure to act affirmatively to include
a private right of action should have been construed as an affirmative decision
People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 80 N.E. 383 (1907) (corporation's acts in making
political contribution were ultra vires).
The complaint originally filed in Ash charged that the corporate expenditure was ultra vires
and illegal under the law of Delaware, the state of Bethlehem Steel's incorporation. Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari at 9, Ash v. Cort, 42 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. June 20, 1974) (No. 73-1908).
When ordered by the court to post security for defendants' expenses as a condition to maintaining
the state cause of action (pursuant to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 433 (1967)), plaintiff amended his
complaint to eliminate the pendant state claim, Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 11, and to seek
damages as well as an injunction under the federal election statute. 496 F.2d at 419. In a very
recent decision, the Third Circuit held that § 610, the statute involved in Ash, supplies a
standard for directors' liability in state actions for corporate waste. Miller v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., Civil No. 73-2007 (3d Cir., Nov. 4, 1974) (per Seitz, J.). The court concluded that since
payments in violation of § 610 are illegal, they are ipso facto ultra vires, and that if plaintiffs
could prove the elements of a § 610 violation, the directors of the defendant corporation would be
liable to the corporation for the amount of the political contribution.
108. 377 U.S. at 431-32, 433. The Court in Borak also drew support from Congress' grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts for enforcement of the Act. Id. at 431. The election
laws contain no such jurisdictional provision.
109. It has been suggested that another consideration would be the pendency in Congress of
measures to reform the area of law. See Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893-95
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). In fact, Congress is considering a number of
comprehensive campaign reform measures at the present time. E.g., S. 2943, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); H.R. 16,011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See note 120 infra.
110. 496 F.2d at 427 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Aldisert pointed out that the
majority's willingness to find a private cause of action without any evidence of congressional
intent could lead, at its logical extreme, to the untenable conclusion that Congress impliedly had
enacted a companion civil code to the entire federal criminal code. Id. at 429. He maintained that
to by-pass the "clear legislative intent" test would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers and would constitute judicial legislation. Id. at 426-28. The dispute between the
majority and the dissent in Ash concerning the necessity of finding clear congressional approval
for implied civil causes of action under § 610 centered on a fundamental disagreement as to the
proper limits of judicial power in construing legislation. It has been argued persuasively that the
doctrine of separation of powers requires that the judiciary avoid finding implied private
remedies absent some express indication of congressional intent in favor thereof. Chavez v.
Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); see
Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. Colo. L. Rev. 529, 535 (1969). See generally A.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 46-47 (1962); 1 Sutherland, supra note 12, at § 3.06. Courts
are not equipped to carry out the extensive investigations that may be necessary to assess the full
impact of a change in federal statutory law. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388,-427-30 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
111. 496 F.2d at 427 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); see notes 109 supra & 120 infra.
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to exclude such a remedy.'12 Moreover, applying the expressio unius rule to
the total scheme of political contributions legislation, the dissent stated that
T.I.M.E. was controlling. ' 3 He pointed out that Congress had amended
section 610 in Title II of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197 I."4 Title
I of that Act imposed, for the first time, certain reporting and disclosure
requirements on candidates and campaign committees,'"5 and expressly pro-
vided for both civil actions by the Attorney General and criminal sanctions to
curb violations of Title III provisions." 6 On this basis, Judge Aldisert argued
that the express provision for civil enforcement in Title III was tantamount to
an intentional exclusion in section 610 as amended by Title 11.117 The
majority refused to draw this inference."18 The expressio unius rule thus
applied by the dissent does not yield persuasive results. That rule requires a
basic similarity between the two provisions under comparison; otherwise, the
expression in one cannot logically be said to imply exclusion in the other. This
basic similarity does not exist between Titles II and I of the 1971 law."19
It seems, therefore, that the impact of Ash lies in the fact that the court
used an election law, containing express penal sanctions against financial
contributions that disturb the democratic electoral process, as a device to
extend federal jurisdiction over internal corporate acts and to grant sharehol-
ders a federal right of action against the directors of their company. This
decision is grounded in what is, at best, a secondary purpose of the Corrupt
Practices Act. When a federal act aims broadly to cure a variety of evils, there
is no objection to basing a private implied cause of action in a second purpose
of the statute. Yet, the alleged second purpose of the Corrupt Practices Act is
supported by little congressional history and less reason.
IV. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, it is important that federal courts develop and implement
remedies for violations of federal statutory rights when the legislature-either
112. 496 F.2d at 428 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); see note 16 supra and accompanying text.
113. 496 F.2d at 427-28 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
114. Act. of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. H, 86 Stat. 11, amending 18 U.S.C.
§§ 591, 600, 608, 610, 611 (1970) and repealing 18 U.S.C. § 609 (1970) (codified as 18 U.S.C.
§§ 591, 600, 608, 610, 611 (Supp. I1, 1972)).
115. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. II, 1972).
116. Id. §§ 438(d)(1)-(5), 441.
117. 496 F.2d at 427-28 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 421-22 n.4.
119. The different remedy provisions of the three Parts of the Interstate Commerce Act at
issue in T.I.M.E. were set forth in parallel regulatory schemes which were intended to control
similar problems in different areas of the shipping industry. See notes 27-30 supra and accom-
panying text. By contrast, Title III of the 1971 Election Act was neither aimed at the same
problems nor sufficiently parallel in structure to Title 11 to apply the expressio unius rule to the
type of enforcement selected by Congress in § 610. Similarly, Amtrak is not valid authority for
application of the expressio unius rule in Ash. In Amtrak, the express provision for private
enforcement only in cases involving labor agreements demonstrated clearly that Congress had
considered the issue of private enforcement. See notes 20-21, 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
By contrast, the fact that Congress provided for only penal enforcement of § 610 does not indicate
anything similar about legislative attitude toward private enforcement.
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by express wording or by clear intendment-so directs. Yet, it is equally
important that courts refrain from expanding statutory liabilities and penal-
ties with no more support than that the judicially discovered "purpose" of the
act would, in the court's view, be "furthered." To a large degree, that is what
the Third Circuit has done in Ash v. Cort and what the federal courts will
continue to do unless the Supreme Court restricts such judicial "construc-
tion." 120
Jamie Sylvester Smith
120. The following addition should be noted with respect to the federal election laws.
Congress recently passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263. This Act, which will generally become effective on January 1, 1975, id. § 410(a),
among other things increases the fines for violation of § 610, id. § 101(e)(1)(A), (B), and
established a Federal Election Commission to obtain compliance with, and to formulate policy
with respect to § 610 and other sections of the election laws. Id. § 208(a). The Commission must
entertain complaints registered by any person concerning violations of § 610 and other sections,
and has the power to conduct investigations into alleged violations as well as to bring civil actions
in federal district court to restrain or enjoin violaiions found to exist after investigation. Id.
Neither the Act nor the legislative history thereof (S. Rep. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1237, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1438, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)) contains any
discussion of implied private damages or enforcement actions.
